The multiple streams model, developed by Kingdon in the United States (US), is being adapted increasingly to study European Union (EU) policy-making. This, however, is revealing a theoretical underdevelopment in some of its central components. The present paper considers several concerns. It seeks to develop the idea of policy entrepreneurship as a context-specific activity that gives substance to the claim that 'ideas have their time'; it interprets the key notion of ambiguity, in the EU context, to mean institutional ambiguity; and it allows for spillovers between policy areas to be endogenous as well as exogenous. This affects the nature of the policy windows wherein policy entrepreneurship occurs. The adapted multiple streams model is used to analyse the 2005 EU sugar policy reform. Institutional ambiguity and endogenous spillovers are shown to create the conditions that enabled active policy entrepreneurship to lead, ultimately, to reform of this most resilient of policies.
Importantly, some policy issues occupy the policy arenas of different DGs -but the hierarchical structure of authority between DGs in cross-cutting cases is ambiguous.
Ambiguities over policy issues and arenas give the first area of underdevelopment in the MS model. Kingdon argues a spillover can create a precedent, influencing future decisions in other policy arenas (see below). We argue that because policy issues can occupy different policy arenas (such as the remits of different DGs), this affects the nature of the spillover that can occur. The kind of precedent described by Kingdon is akin to a political 'demonstration effect'. This we describe below as an exogenous spillover, where "adjacent" policy arenas are unconnected institutionally. If a policy issue occupies multiple institutionally-connected policy arenas, a policy decision taken in one arena may impact directly on policy decisions in others, even forcing a decision when none otherwise would be made. This we describe as an endogenous spillover. In our empirical analysis sugar is a policy issue located across multiple institutionally-connected EU arenas, being part of agricultural, trade and development policies and the respective DGs. A change to sugar policy in one arena may lead causally to change in sugar-related policies in other arenas.
As stated above, policy reform occurs in policy 'windows'. For Kingdon (2003, p.192) "it is important to move very quickly [on policy reform]. The window in the first area opens windows in adjacent areas, but they close rapidly as well." We offer below a theoretical adjustment to the MS model in which the characteristics of endogenous spillovers can hold windows open for a longer time. With sugar, change in one policy P o s t p r i n t arena created an imperative for change in another, but reform in the latter was not required immediately.
In the broader context of MS, the nature and duration of the reform window affects bargaining over agenda-setting and policy-making. This leads into a third theoretical development. In the original MS model -and in much work since -there is both a functional and physical separation of policy entrepreneurs and decision-makers. We argue this distinction is too stark: entrepreneurs may not simply sell ideas to decisionmakers, but be involved directly in decision-making. Thus we draw an analytical distinction between the individuals who are policy entrepreneurs and the process of policy entrepreneurship (PE), allowing us to isolate different facets of entrepreneurial activity. This distinction is significant to our case study: the key individual in sugar acted as a policy entrepreneur in pushing a particular policy idea, but he does not conform to Kingdon's notion of a policy entrepreneur because of his institutional role in policy-making.
The final theoretical contribution offered is to argue that all the above issues are related. Endogenous spillovers can hold open windows of opportunity for policy reform longer than envisaged by Kingdon, creating space for contestation over control of the policy agenda. This contestation is compounded by spillovers which create ambiguities over the decision-making authority of different institutions, in the absence of a clearly-defined institutional hierarchy. Entrepreneurs can thus push policies affecting not only their own policy arena directly, but also others which the policy issue (in our case, sugar) occupies.
The paper, in the next section, elaborates these theoretical adjustments to the MS model. It then presents the empirical case of sugar, a representative case of crosssectoral EU policy-making as it is complex; involves multiple institutionallyconnected policy arenas; and is the subject of international regulation. The adapted MS model reveals reasons for the previous lack of reform of the CAP sugar regime, to draw together these elements, combining endogenous and exogenous spillovers with a focusing event in the policy window (Kingdon 2003, pp.94-100) . Underpinned by data from elite interviews, we argue each factor was necessary but not sufficient individually to explain fully the reform agreement. Kingdon (2003, p.86 ) likens decision-making in the US federal government to "organized anarchy". In the spirit of Zahariadis (2003, p .1) we ask how useful a model developed in such conditions is, not for "parliamentary systems" as does Zahariadis, but for the specific agenda-setting and decision-making structure of the EU. This paper interprets ambiguity in institutional terms, the term 'institutional ambiguity' referring to a policy-making environment of overlapping institutions lacking a clear hierarchy. In this paper, the critical overlap is between DGs within the Commission. Each DG oversees a particular thematic area, but policy issues can overlap multiple thematic areas.
Institutions and Institutional Ambiguity
From the perspective of different policy areas, each DG has a clear mandate. From the perspective of the policy issue, however, there is no hierarchy prioritising unambiguously one policy area/DG over another, although interviews reveal Agriculture (DG-AGRI) and Trade (DG-TRADE) are dominant within the Commission. Thus, for example, whilst proposals for reform of the domestic sugar regime come from DG-AGRI, the context of their policy-making may change if DG-TRADE proposes a trade policy change affecting sugar. DG-AGRI may have to propose reform of the CAP sugar regime -whether they want to or not.
Thus even with institutional ambiguity, formal institutional roles with formal authority still exist, and political actors occupying these roles can have distinctively institutional power in defining policy agendas and shaping the process of alternative specification. This stands as a counterpoint to claims of institutional fluidity or even 'deinstitutionalisation' in the EU (Zahariadis 2008) . Further, Zahariadis (2008, p.524) talks of EU decision-making being "mostly institutionally autonomous but not hierarchical". We agree on the lack of hierarchy, but argue that where policy issues P o s t p r i n t are present in different policy areas, where spillovers are endogenous (see below) and where institutional ambiguity exists, decision-making may not be autonomous. Indeed, we offer a novel theoretical contribution by arguing institutional roles may enable policy-makers to act as commissioners of ideas and proposals in response to policy windows, conceived as signals from the wider policy environment. As such the causal mechanism is not brokering or the indefatigability of entrepreneurs as advocates, but a filter-based selection mechanism where intentional agents select deliberately among the policy ideas available in the wider political system.
Policy Spillovers and Window Duration in the MS Model
A policy issue located in multiple policy areas can lead to ambiguity in policy-making.
A theoretical corollary concerns the nature of spillovers. Kingdon (2003, p.190) argues a spillover "sometimes establishes a principle that will guide future decisions within a policy arena. At other times, a precedent spills over from one arena into an adjacent one." He thus sees spillovers occurring when ideas pass between institutionally-unrelated policy areas. Haas (1968, p.297) , in contrast, argued that market forces, released through liberalisation in one sector, created liberalisation pressures across the economy. This was more than epiphenomenal precedent-setting or a demonstration effect: it was connected directly to the initial policy decision, with the unliberalised parts of the economy affected by liberalisation in connected sectors.
We develop this notion with reference to the existence of policy issues occupying multiple policy areas. Change to the issue in one area can lead directly and causally to change in that issue in a different policy area. With sugar, specific features of a trade policy including sugar had a causal impact on the CAP sugar regime. We refer to the kind of spillover identified by Kingdon as exogenous, and to the latter as an endogenous spillover -the distinction rooted in the institutional inter-connectedness (or not) of policy areas.
Endogenous spillovers are signals between elements within the policy system of pressures for reform and receptivity for different policy proposals. Where institutions overlap, creating ambiguity, and lacking a clear hierarchy, endogenous spillovers represent a temporal (re)ordering of priority: a policy decision at time 1 under one institution in the policy system may spill over, creating reform pressures and shifting P o s t p r i n t the receptivity of policy proposals from other policy institutions within the system at time 2. Policy institutions gain priority under ambiguity by initiating spillovers rather than being subject to them. At the same time, skilful policy entrepreneurs may use endogenous spillover effects to further a certain agenda or policy proposal elsewhere.
The nature and duration of policy spillovers can therefore transform institutional ambiguity into conflict, affecting the balance of power in struggles over the agenda, the specification of alternatives and sequence of decision-making. Endogenous spillovers can hold windows open for longer than envisaged by Kingdon. Thus two separate reform events are linked by an endogenous spillover but separated by time.
Policy Entrepreneurs, Policy Entrepreneurship and Institutional Ambiguity
In the MS model, the activities of policy entrepreneurs explain if policy windows are exploited and a policy reform agreed and implemented. Kingdon's ambition is to illuminate the ceteris paribus clause for the comparative analysis of policy processes.
No entrepreneur can cause policy reform alone; we always require a set of background conditions for a PE strategy to cause reform, fixed by a ceteris paribus clause. If conditions change in another case -i.e. everything is not equal -we cannot infer the same entrepreneurial causal mechanism. The skilled advocacy of a policy idea, or skilled brokering, will only produce reform in some political and temporal contexts: this is the causal structure behind the maxim 'ideas have their time'.
In his analysis of the context for entrepreneurship, Kingdon (2003, p.165) defends the independence of the three streams, but acknowledges there is, in practice, the possibility of interaction between them (ibid, p.228). Throughout his work Kingdon stresses participants should be separated from processes and that -although unlikelythe same participant may act in each stream. Indeed, during policy windows multistream working is essential for policy entrepreneurs to perform their brokering as opposed to advocacy role. Even so, with advocacy or brokering the policy window simply provides a coupling opportunity. In this paper, to highlight opportunities for creative and entrepreneurial agency in policy-making, we introduce policy commissioning as an alternative coupling mechanism. Policy windows are understood as changes in signals from the broader policy environment to creative and intentional agents who, in response, adjust their selection rules for adjudicating among the P o s t p r i n t options available in the policy stream. In such an intentional selection mechanism, the nature of a policy window affects the commissioning activity of policy-makers.
Coupling by intentional selection
Coupling is critical in the Kingdon model, as the means by which opportunities to push particular policies are successfully exploited to raise a policy proposal high onto the decision agenda. Zahariadis (2007) 
P o s t p r i n t
Furthermore, for Corbett it is essential to appreciate these are individuals with life histories, personal beliefs, identities: to apprehend fully their influence in policy change, they must be understood in terms beyond institutional context.
Without doubting that claim, this raises questions about what the concept of PE adds;
Corbett seems to use PE as a general term for the claim that in certain institutional roles some agents are better than others in implementing successfully policy and political strategies (and that institutional roles do not rigidly determine their views and actions). Our alternative analytical strategy has policy-makers, instead of being passive agents sold coupling strategies by policy entrepreneurs, employ intentional filter mechanisms to select a policy solution appropriate for the agenda they construct from changes in environmental signals (the policy window). Thus policy solutions may get on the agenda not by being sold by persistent skillful policy entrepreneurs, but because policy-makers select the ideas appropriate for the policy window and thus the policy entrepreneurs who advocate. This is another way of understanding the intuition that ideas have their time. Coupling responds to the opportunity, suited to the nature of the policy window.
This alternative specification adumbrates problems in the concept of PE outlined earlier: most pertinently, are those hitherto called policy-makers actually policy entrepreneurs? If so, two separate policy-making mechanisms are conflated: selling ideas to policy-makers and selecting ideas by policy-makers. Both may be entrepreneurial. We prefer to understand PE as a general label for a set of behaviours in the policy process, rather than a permanent characteristic of a particular individual or role. Thus the attribution of causality to agency qua PE is only ever temporary, acutely sensitive to context and situation. Even Mintrom, 2000, a key contribution to the literature on policy entrepreneurs, sees entrepreneurs operating outside decisionmaking circles.
3 Moreover, on page 57 he argues "The policy entrepreneur must define problems in ways that are not readily dismissed by those who benefit from current policy settings." If a policy-maker acts as entrepreneur, however, not only is this constraint lifted in their arena (Interviews 2 and 11 emphasised Least Developed
Countries' (LDCs) opposition to sugar's inclusion in EBA), exploiting endogenous spillovers allows them to manoeuvre for reform in adjacent arenas without such constraints: once the Trade Commissioner included sugar in EBA, this forced the DG-P o s t p r i n t AGRI agenda on EU sugar policy reform regardless of opposition from beneficiaries of the extant policy.
The discussion of PE in EU policy-making tends to rely on the unstated argument that entrepreneurial characteristics at the individual level are not normally distributed in the population; there is something distinctive about individual policy entrepreneurs.
However, this attribution is always done ex post, limiting our understanding of PE.
Moreover, difficulties remain in identifying clearly successful PE. It may be associated with change but, for example, PE may seek defence of the status quo, with strategies employed to preserve institutions and policy systems against reform (see, inter alia, the discussion of "nondecisions" by Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 43-51) .
Alternatively, one might wish to impute failed PE as the inverse of successful PE.
Thus, according to Zahariadis (2003: 15) , entrepreneurs will be more successful when employing "salami tactics": if policy entrepreneurs recognise risk-averse policymakers are unlikely to accept a politically-risky proposal, they can cut the policy move into stages, presenting smaller less-risky steps sequentially to policymakers. But whilst this may imply other tactics reduce an entrepreneur's likelihood of successful PE, it does not mean either that salami tactics guarantee successful PE, nor that other tactics are bound to fail: one cannot with absolute certainty infer the success or not of PE from the tactic employed.
Thus, following Kingdon, we see PE occurring at the nexus of two phenomena: (i) the opportunity and (ii) the individuals. This is the logic Kingdon follows in articulating why, when and how opportunities for successful PE arise; but what Kingdon misses is a rigorous account of why, when and how (a) only some discover PE opportunities;
and (b) different strategies/actions are used to exploit PE opportunities. Thus we need a mechanism to explain why some might discover an opportunity and others not.
Informational advantages seem an obvious candidate, alongside cognitive skill interpreting and acting on those advantages. This is related to institutional position. In our case study, we explore key policy events leading to the 2005 reform of the EU sugar regime. Our interviews reveal PE was not purely reactive to a given situation:
rather, entrepreneurial commissioning activity towards sugar in one policy arena created an irresistible pressure for policy change in another, opening a policy window.
P o s t p r i n t 
Stability in EU sugar policy
Why, though, was sugar not reformed previously? Within the CAP sugar is, arguably, unique. 4 To produce sugar the agricultural output -primarily beet in the EU -is processed at capital-intensive off-farm facilities requiring substantial investment, and a high degree of capacity-utilisation for profitability. The bulky beet also sees processors locate close to growers, creating a geographical concentration of sugar interests, providing a range of jobs in localised rural areas. Sugar beet is also a highercost sugar source than the alternative, cane. Price support thus provided uncompetitive EU sugar considerable protection vis-à-vis lower-cost imports. The Sugar Protocol, however, meant several developing countries benefited directly from P o s t p r i n t the domestic sugar regime, which the EU viewed as important development assistance.
Another feature is that spending on sugar, uniquely, has been funded from producer levies rather than general EU budget revenues. This made sugar essentially budgetneutral, distancing it from the growing cost of the CAP through the 1980s. Moreover food processors, major users of sugar, received transfers to help offset high prices (Interview 4), limiting their opposition to this policy.
5
International trade negotiations have also, until recently, had little impact on sugar.
One interviewee (Interview 4) argued the US would have accepted a Uruguay Round
Agriculture Agreement based on cereals, the export commodity of most concern to them, had the Cairns Group not worked to include other commodities. Even so, the agreement on domestic support was based on an Aggregate Measure of Support, as sought by EU negotiators, which allowed deep cuts in cereals price support to be traded-off against sustained support for other commodities (such as sugar). Even the market access agreement saw sugar "get away" with a 20% cut (Interview 11).
Everything But Arms
There are two important aspects to the role of EBA in subsequent sugar reform. First, DFQF access for sugar would breach the protective wall around the EU sugar market created by price support (hence Brüntrup, 2007 , calling EBA a 'Trojan Horse').
Second, there is the role of Pascal Lamy who, as EU Trade Commissioner, did not merely advocate EBA but was its commissioner (small 'c'). The presence of sugar in EBA created an endogenous spillover to the EU agricultural policy arena. In the adapted MS model proposed in the paper, Lamy's PE is understood in the context of opportunities provided by the institutional ambiguity that had developed around EU sugar policy.
Problems Stream
EBA is part of the EU Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). During the 1990s, concern grew over LDCs' lack of participation in trade, despite preferential provisions.
The 1996 Singapore WTO Ministerial produced an Action Plan for LDCs 6 and, in September 2000, the United Nations Millennium Summit agreed the "Millennium Declaration". Point 15, resolved "to address the special needs of the least developed countries", with a 'Conference on the Least Developed Countries' in Brussels in May P o s t p r i n t
Industrialised countries should "adopt, preferably by the time of that
Conference, a policy of duty-and quota-free access for essentially all exports from the least developed countries". EBA was the EU response. Commissioner Lamy decided on the "full monty" response (Interview 8), hoping also thereby to gain LDC support for the EU in the WTO Doha Round. Lamy saw problems for three commodities with DFQF that, he felt, could be overcome with transition periods: bananas, rice and sugar.
Politics Stream
There was strong opposition from the sugar sector to sugar's inclusion in EBA, given the threat to the high-price regime. That said, such opposition was undermined by EBA being a policy oriented towards LDCs. Thus attempts to exclude sugar risked being painted as opposition to helping the poorest countries (Interview 11). A second factor was the speed with which the EBA proposal was put together (Interview 8),
catching DG-AGRI totally by surprise (Interview 7). It was "whipped" through the with subsidy a quantity of sugar beyond its Uruguay Round commitments. This had two elements. First, it was argued sugar produced beyond quota ('C-sugar'), excluded from the export subsidy commitment schedule as it should be exported at the world price without subsidy, was cross-subsidised from supported within-quota production.
Second, the EU exported a quantity of domestically-produced sugar equal to imports under the Sugar Protocol. The outcome, which upheld both complaints, meant the EU had to make significant cuts in subsidised exports (in 2000/01, subsidised EU exports exceeded the agreed limit by over 2.8 million tonnes). The ruling on the crosssubsidisation of C-sugar exports referred to an earlier AB ruling on Canadian Dairy policy, 8 an example of an exogenous spillover consistent with Kingdon's precedentsetting.
Several factors explain the timing of the WTO action. First, the Uruguay Round Agreement's transitional 'implementing period' ended in 2000. Only then could an assessment be made of subsidised exports relative to commitments (Interview 3).
Then followed negotiations amongst interests (sectoral and governmental), notably in Australia and Brazil, as cases were prepared. This was completed first in Australia;
there was then a sense of being kept waiting by Brazil (Interview 3). The Brazilians, however, were also preparing an action against the US cotton regime -and Brazil felt the best strategy was to bring both cases simultaneously. They thus waited on sugar until the other case was ready (Interview 6). The length of the sugar case was then determined by WTO processes. These factors determined when the EU needed to begin its response to the ruling although, as discussed later, there was further disagreement over the speed of their response.
Sugar as Odd-One-Out
Our adapted MS model includes endogenous alongside exogenous spillovers as factors in policy change. The sugar regime, subject to five-yearly review, had been An interesting view from within DG-AGRI (Interview 9) was that pressures on the sugar policy were "fortunate", as they made it easier for DG-AGRI to propose reform.
This raises an important issue regarding control of the policy window. Kingdon (2003: 205-206) talks both of problems being identified then solutions sought, and vice versa:
"solutions searching for problems" as Zahariadis (2008: 519) puts it. DG-AGRI, however, knew the problem and they had a solution: to extend SFPs to sugar. What they lacked was the window to exploit -and, by implication, the inability to open the window themselves.
More open to contestation were the details of the reform, especially the scale of price and quota cuts. The WTO ruling required reductions in subsidised exports and in P o s t p r i n t spending on export subsidies. Cuts in production quota would reduce exportable surpluses. Reduced support prices would lower both unit export subsidies and production incentives; with price and quota cuts being mutually reinforcing.
Discussions in the WTO Doha Round were, however, moving towards eliminating subsidised exports. For EU sugar, an average world-EU price gap of about 300% made a reform based on price cuts alone unlikely. Moreover, the deeper the price cut the greater the cost to the EU budget of larger SFPs. The more likely option was a price cut plus large quota cut. Although there was no obligation yet on the EU to eliminate subsidised sugar exports, such a move would enhance the EU negotiating position in the Doha Round.
A key unknown in the reform debate was the magnitude of DFQF imports under EBA.
Estimates varied greatly over both 'direct' exports of surpluses; and 'triangular trade', where LDCs would export domestic production to the EU at prices above world levels, then import from elsewhere at the world price to cover domestic demand. Crucially, price cuts would reduce the incentives to export to the EU and limit the quota cut needed to balance the EU market. DG-AGRI were predicting higher imports than DG-TRADE, which may explain a price cut proposal deeper than many expected given the WTO ruling (Interview 9). Importantly also, EU producers would be compensated however deep the price cut.
Explaining the Timing of EU Sugar Reform
The EU reform proposals were published within weeks of the WTO AB decision and interviewee was reluctant to talk about 'reform' (Interview 13), as the difficult policy tools were still in place and EU prices were still about twice world levels.
Conclusions
The multiple streams model, developed by Kingdon in the US, is used increasingly to study EU policy-making. However, early non-US applications revealed theoretical underdevelopments in some central components. The present paper has sought to address several inter-related concerns. Ambiguity in decision-making is a core feature of the MS model; this paper has considered ambiguity in EU decision-making in institutional terms: uncertainty over hierarchy within Commission structures is compounded when policy issues exist in multiple policy arenas (under the purview of different Directorates-General). This creates the potential for policy spillovers quite distinct from those envisaged by Kingdon. Such 'endogenous' spillovers mean, first, a policy issue subject to decision-making in one policy arena may affect causally P o s t p r i n t high-priced, EU market regime. Interviews revealed he was fully aware of this; and was able to exploit his role as policy entrepreneur, through an endogenous spillover, to put pressure on DG-AGRI.
Whilst EBA opened the reform window on the domestic sugar regime, however, the transition period for free market access meant a reform response to EBA was not needed immediately: the window would be open for several years. In the meantime a Focusing Event, a WTO ruling against the EU sugar regime, imposed a more immediate timeframe on reform. By this time, moreover, a combination of reforms to other commodities and shifts in personnel resulted in pro-reform sentiment building even within DG-AGRI. Reforms to other commodities provided precedents in terms of policy instruments, whilst EBA and WTO factors dictated the magnitude of changes to key policy variables and the timing of the changes. That is, a full understanding of EU sugar reform must integrate all reform pressures. One interviewee (Interview 5) expressed doubts over whether the WTO ruling "caused" the EU reform. What our analysis has shown is that this was not sufficient, by itself, to explain fully the reform implemented; but was a key factor that, with EBA and P o s t p r i n t 20 sugar's exceptionalism, led finally to reform of the last major unreformed sector under the CAP.
